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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Solyndra congressional investigation prompted an inter-branch 
struggle over President Obama’s withholding of information.  One-time 
presidential candidate Michelle Bachmann went so far as to call Solyndra 
a “historic scandal” worse than Watergate.1  However, unlike Watergate, 
the Solyndra investigation did not lead to a constitutional showdown 
between the branches of government.  Rather, the White House engaged 
in the sort of give-and-take with Congress that the Constitution 
encourages.  On the other hand, the congressional subcommittee 
investigating the Solyndra controversy fell short of the good-faith 
negotiation envisioned by the Framers of the Constitution. 
This article examines the Solyndra Congressional investigation as a 
case study in how the executive and legislative branches should fulfill 
their constitutional roles while negotiating over access to information.  
The article concludes by suggesting a legal standard that a court could 
have used if this inter-branch conflict had been litigated in federal court. 
 
II. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE & THE CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO 
INVESTIGATE 
The text of the Constitution does not explicitly mention executive 
privilege.2  Similarly, no constitutional language clearly authorizes 
Congress to subpoena information from the executive branch.3  Rather, 
the Supreme Court has held that the prerogatives of presidential 
confidentiality and congressional inquiry are rooted in the Constitution’s 
system of checks and balances.4  Of course, the interests of presidential 
confidentiality and congressional accountability are often in tension.  The 
following subsections will examine how the Framers approached this 
tension and explain how the Supreme Court has reconciled these 
competing interests. 
 
 
 
 
 
1  Christian Heinze, Bachmann: Solyndra is Worse than Watergate, THE HILL (Nov. 18, 
2011, 1:38 PM), http://gop12.thehill.com/2011/11/bachmann-solyndra-is-worse-than.html. 
2  In re Sealed Case (Espy), 121 F.3d 729, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
3  McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927) (finding that the Congress’ power to 
conduct oversight is inherent in its power to legislate). 
4  United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 712–13 (1974); Daugherty, 273 U.S. at 175. 
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A. The Framers’ Perspective 
The Framers created a system that recognized the competing 
interests of presidential confidentiality and congressional accountability.  
They understood that the President needed a degree of confidentiality to 
make informed decisions.5  At the same time, the Framers did not intend 
for the President to have absolute confidentiality and therefore, equipped 
Congress with the power to oversee the White House.6 
The Framers feared a tyrannical executive and wanted Congress to 
be the strongest of the three branches.7  Federalist 51 explains that “[i]n 
a republican [form of] government, the legislature necessarily 
predominates.”8  Based upon lessons from history under the British 
monarchs, the country’s founders understood the dangers of an 
uncontrolled executive and wanted the legislature to investigate 
wrongdoing in the executive branch.9  At the Constitutional Convention, 
George Mason said that Congress possessed not just legislative power, 
but also “inquisitorial powers” and must “meet frequently to inspect the 
Conduct of the public offices.”10 
The Framers believed that the competing interests of presidential 
confidentiality and congressional accountability could coexist in a system 
of separated powers because each political branch would fight to protect 
their own prerogatives against encroachment by the other.11  Federalist 
47 refers to such a system of checks and balances as an “invaluable 
precept in the science of politics.”12 
Indeed, the tension between presidential confidentiality and 
congressional accountability goes as far back as the presidency of George 
Washington.13  In 1794, the Senate requested copies of correspondence 
 
5 THE FEDERALIST NO. 64 (John Jay) (recognizing that the Constitution entrusts the 
President with certain matters that require “secrecy”). 
6 LOUIS FISCHER, THE POLITICS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 5 (2004). 
7 MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER, SECRECY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY 11–12 (3d ed. 2010). 
8 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (Alexander Hamilton & James Madison). 
9 ROZELL, supra note 7, at 11. 
10 2 THE RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 206 (Max Farrand, 
ed., 1966). 
11 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 2003) (“Ambition 
must be made to counteract ambition.”). 
12 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison). 
13 Stephen L. Carter, Obama Should Still Resist Congress on Solyndra, BLOOMBERG 
(Nov. 10, 2011, 10:39 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-11/obama-should-
still-resist-congress-on-solyndra-stephen-carter.html. 
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between the French government and the United States ambassador.14  
Washington believed that disclosing such correspondence would harm 
the public interest.15  After consulting with his Cabinet, Washington 
decided that he could constitutionally withhold some of the information.16  
Washington wrote to the Senate to let them know that he was sending 
copies of the correspondence “except in those particulars [which] in [his] 
judgment, for public considerations, ought not to be communicated.”17  
The first Congress never challenged Washington on this withholding of 
information, thus creating the precedent that the executive could refuse 
to disclose communications if the purpose was to protect the secrecy of 
communications and such a goal was in the public’s interest.18 
As was the case in the Washington example, most executive 
privilege disputes regarding access to information are resolved 
informally without the need for litigation.19  However, as the next section 
explains, some disputes have found their way into federal court, thus 
shaping the legal contours of executive privilege.20 
 
B. Judicial Interpretation 
The leading case on executive privilege is United States v. Nixon in 
which President Nixon invoked executive privilege when Watergate 
Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski sought access to tape recordings of 
Nixon’s conversations with White House advisors.21  President Nixon 
argued that he had absolute immunity from requests for information from 
a grand jury.22  In fact, Nixon’s attorney, James D. St. Clair claimed that 
the “[P]resident want[ed] [him] to argue that he [wa]s as powerful a 
monarch as Louis XIV, only four years at a time, and [wa]s not subject 
to the processes of any court in the land.”23 
 
14 ROZELL, supra note 7, at 30–32. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Neil Devins, Congressional-Executive Information Access Disputes: A Modest 
Proposal-Do Nothing, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 115 (1996). 
20 See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Judicial Watch Inc. v. Dep’t of 
Justice, 365 F3d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2004); In re Cheney, 334 F.3d 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2003); United 
States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Senate Select Comm. on 
Presidential Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
21 Nixon, 418 U.S. at 683. 
22 Id. at 686. 
23 Samuel Dash, Morality in American Politics: Is it Possible? 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 773, 781 
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The Court in Nixon made it clear that there was not an unqualified 
presidential privilege.  The Court held that executive privilege is a 
qualified privilege that can be outweighed by countervailing needs.24  The 
Court applied a balancing test, weighing the grand jury’s need for 
information against the President’s need for confidentiality.25  The Court 
acknowledged the importance of executive branch confidentiality, noting 
that a President should receive candid advice from White House 
advisors.26  However, concern about the public disclosure of advisors’ 
communications could force advisors to hold back their advice.27  The 
Court opined that advisors who “expect public dissemination of their 
remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for 
their own interests to the detriment of the decision-making process.”28  
Nonetheless, the Court held that the grand jury’s need for important 
evidence in a criminal investigation outweighed President Nixon’s need 
for confidentiality.29 
A number of District of Columbia Circuit cases, such as In re Sealed 
Case (“Espy”), have put flesh on the bones of executive privilege 
jurisprudence.30  Like Nixon, Espy arose out of a claim of executive 
privilege against a grand jury’s request for information.31  President 
Clinton asserted the privilege against Independent Counsel Donald 
Smaltz’s subpoena for materials used to prepare a White House Counsel’s 
Office (“Counsel’s Office”) report, responding to allegations that 
Secretary of Agriculture Mike Espy had accepted inappropriate benefits.32  
The District of Columbia Circuit found that the privilege should apply 
only to communications “authored or solicited and received” by the 
President’s staff members who have “broad and significant 
responsibility” for offering advice to the President on the matter to which 
the communications relate.33  Such a holding is relevant because it will 
later be analyzed and applied to the Solyndra conflict along with the 
 
(2001). 
24 Nixon, 418 U.S. at 684–85. 
25 Id. at 711–12. 
26 Id. at 708. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 705. 
29 Id. at 713. 
30 In re Sealed Case (Espy), 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
31 Id. at 729. 
32 Id. at 734–35. 
33 Id. at 758. 
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potential consequences that could have arisen had the conflict been 
litigated in federal court. 
Just as a grand jury’s need to obtain relevant evidence in a criminal 
trial can outweigh executive privilege, the legislature’s need for 
information can also outweigh the President’s need for confidentiality.  
The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress requires information 
from the executive branch to fulfill its constitutional duties to legislate 
and provide oversight.34  In the leading case of McGrain v. Daugherty,35 
the Supreme Court reasoned that Congress’ power to conduct oversight 
is inherent in its power to legislate, finding that a “legislative body cannot 
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting 
the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change.”36  
Furthermore, history has shown that congressional committees play an 
important role in uncovering wrongdoing in the executive branch from 
the Teapot Dome scandal to the Hurricane Katrina congressional 
hearings.37 
As a general matter, courts are reluctant to get involved in inter-
branch disputes between the executive and the legislature.38  As a result, 
the political branches must negotiate with each other over access to 
information.  This sort of inter-branch back-and-forth occurred in the 
Solyndra investigation, but as the following section explains, the White 
House was more faithful to the guidance of the Nixon Court to resolve 
“competing interests” in a manner that “preserves the essential functions 
of each branch.”39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187–88 (1957). 
35 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927). 
36 Id. 
37 Ensuring Executive Branch Accountability: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 26–31 (2007) 
(statement of John Podesta, President, Ctr. for Am. Progress). 
38 TODD GARVEY & ALISSA M. DOLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL42670, PRESIDENTIAL 
CLAIMS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: HISTORY, LAW, PRACTICE, AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, 1 
(2012). 
39 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974). 
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III. THE SOLYNDRA INVESTIGATION 
The Department of Energy (“DOE”) announced in March 2009 that 
it would offer a conditional $535 million loan guarantee to Solyndra, a 
manufacturer of solar panels based in Fremont, California, to finance the 
construction of a solar panel manufacturing plant.40  Solyndra was the first 
company to receive support through the DOE Loan Guarantee Program 
created under the Bush administration as part of the Energy Policy Act of 
2005.41  President Obama expanded the program as part of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.42 
In May 2010, President Obama was scheduled to visit one of 
Solyndra’s existing plants in California on a trip to highlight his green 
energy agenda.43  Some Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) 
employees worried about the financial stability of the company.44  
Prophetically, these officials feared that President Obama’s visit would 
come back to haunt the administration if Solyndra failed.45  However, 
after reviewing the matter, the White House decided to proceed with the 
trip as planned.46  Months later, Solyndra’s financial difficulties became 
apparent when the company cancelled an initial public offering.47  In the 
fall of 2010, Solyndra closed one of its existing plants and postponed the 
expansion of the manufacturing facility that was built using the DOE loan 
guarantee.48 
In February 2011, DOE generated controversy when it restructured 
the Solyndra loan.49  The terms specified that private entities would be 
 
40 Andrew Restuccia, All About Solyndra: A Short Primer, THE HILL (Nov. 26, 2011, 
3:15 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/195481-all-about-solyndra-a-short-
primer-on-the-controversy. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id.  
46 Restuccia, All About Solyndra, supra note 40. 
47 Solyndra Cancels IPO Plans, Instead Sells Debt, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 
18, 2010, 7:34 AM),  
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9GDLJAG0.htm. 
48 Energy & Commerce Leaders Probe OMB or Role in DOE Stimulus Loan Guarantees, 
Risky Half Billion Award to Solyndra a Top Concern, HOUSE ENERGY & COMMERCE COMM. 
(Mar. 14, 2011), http://energycommerce.house.gov/press-release/energy-commerce-leaders-
probe-omb-role-doe-stimulus-loan-guarantees-risky-half-billion. 
49 Andrew Stiles, GOP to WH: Stop Stonewalling Us on Solyndra Docs, NAT’L. REV. 
ONLINE (Dec. 1, 2011, 7:24 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/284679/gop-wh-
stop-stonewalling-us-solyndra-docs-andrew-stiles. 
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repaid before the federal government if the company defaulted.50  The 
loan restructuring prompted the Oversight and Investigations 
Subcommittee (“Subcommittee”) of the House Energy and Commerce 
Committee (“Committee”) to launch a probe of the loan guarantee in 
February 2011.51  The Chairman of the Committee, Fred Upton (R-MI) 
and the Chairman of the Subcommittee, Cliff Stearns (R-FL) led the 
Solyndra investigation.52  The Committee intensified its investigation 
after Solyndra declared bankruptcy in August 2011.53 
In September 2011, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) 
raided Solyndra’s offices.54  Photos of FBI agents emerging from 
Solyndra headquarters ran in newspapers across the country and 
suggested that a political scandal might be brewing for President 
Obama.55  In an effort to ameliorate the Solyndra fallout, White House 
Chief of Staff Bill Daley announced an independent review of the Energy 
Department’s loan guarantee portfolio.56  Nonetheless, it was clear that 
the Subcommittee intended to ratchet up the political pressure on the 
White House. 
 
 
 
 
50 Joe Stephens & Carol D. Leonnig, Solyndra Loan Deal: Warning about Legality Came 
from Within Obama Administration, WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2011),  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/solyndra-obama-and-rahm-emanuel-pushed-to-
spotlight-energy-company/2011/10/07/gIQACDqSTL_story.html. 
51 Andrew Restuccia & Ben Geman, Second Green Flop Stokes Controversy, THE HILL 
(Nov. 1, 2011, 12:36 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/190915-second-
green-flop-stokes-controversy. 
52 Darren Samuelsohn, Right Nips Fred Upton on Solyndra Handling, POLITICO (Dec. 7, 
2011, 11:55 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1211/70043.html#ixzz1pg9Egv3S. 
53 Andrew Restuccia & Ben Geman, White House Gives Up More Solyndra Docs, THE 
HILL (Feb. 3, 2012, 11:45 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/208653-amid-
comtempt-threat-white-house-sends-gop-more-solyndra-docs. 
54 Joe Stephens & Carol D. Leonnig, FBI Searches Offices of Solyndra; Lawmakers Say 
They were Misled about Firm’s Finances, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2011), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/fbi-searches-shuttered-solyndra-offices-plant-in-
california/2011/09/08/gIQAu4kRCK_story.html. 
55 The Solyndra Scandal: The FBI Raids a Beneficiary of Federal Loan Guarantees, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 9, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424053111904836104576558763644374614. 
56 Scott Wilson, White House Orders Review of Energy Department Loans Amid 
Solyndra Fallout, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2011), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/white-house-orders-independent-review-of-energy-
department-loans/2011/10/28/gIQASsrPQM_story.html. 
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A. The Subcommittee’s Duty to Investigate Solyndra 
Upton and Stearns had a responsibility to obtain information about 
the Solyndra loan guarantee.  The Solyndra investigation fell squarely 
under their purview, as Chairmen of the Committee and the 
Subcommittee, both Representatives held jurisdiction over the affordable 
energy and DOE programs.57  Furthermore, the legislation that had created 
the loan guarantee program had originated in the Committee.58 
The Supreme Court has held that Congress possesses the 
constitutional authority to compel disclosure when the investigation is “in 
aid of legislation.”59  Clearly, the Solyndra investigation met this standard.  
Not only had Solyndra received $535 million of taxpayers’ money, but 
also the Solyndra loan received was part of a DOE program that had 
issued over ten billion dollars in loan guarantees.60  Therefore, problems 
with the Solyndra loan could be symptomatic of larger problems with the 
green energy loans program.  The Subcommittee also had legitimate 
concerns that Solyndra might have received a loan because of the 
company’s financial ties to one of President Obama’s fundraisers, George 
Kaiser.61  This was precisely the type of situation in which the Framers 
wanted Congress to hold the President accountable.  As George Mason 
said at the Constitutional Convention, members of Congress must “meet 
frequently to inspect the Conduct of the public office.”62  As such, the 
Subcommittee had a right to information from the executive branch and 
a duty to investigate the matter. 
Inter-branch conflicts are a normal byproduct of the separation of 
powers principle, and yet, the Framers expected Congress and the 
President to resolve “conflicts in scope of authority” in the way most 
 
57 Letter from Rep. Fred Upton, Chairman, Comm. on Energy & Commerce, & Rep. Cliff 
Stearns, Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations, Comm. on Energy & 
Commerce to Kathryn H. Ruemmler, Counsel to the President (Feb. 9, 2012), available at 
http://burgess.house.gov/uploadedfiles/02.09.2012_letter_to_white_house_counsel_kathryn
_ruemmler_and_cynthia_hogan.pdf. 
58 Energy Policy Act of 2005, H.R. 6, 109th Cong. (2005). 
59 Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 295 (1929). 
60 Sean Higgins, DOE Mulls Green Energy Loans at $23 Million per Job, INVESTOR’S 
BUS. DAILY (Sept. 27, 2011, 5:59 PM), 
http://news.investors.com/article/586155/201109271759/doe-mulls-green-energy-loans-at-
23-million-per-job.htm. 
61 Neela Banerjee, House to Probe Failed Energy Company Solyndra at Hearing, L.A. 
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/12/news/la-pn-solyndra-hearing-
20110912. 
62 2 THE RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 206 (Max Farrand, 
ed., 1966). 
CRAWFORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2015  2:11 PM 
10 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 39:1 
likely to “result in efficient and effective functioning of our governmental 
system.”63  Therefore, the Subcommittee appropriately sent letters to the 
DOE requesting documents and related information rather than 
immediately issuing subpoenas, which would have caused the conflict to 
quickly escalate.  The Subcommittee also requested information from 
OMB, which reviewed and approved the credit subsidy costs of the DOE 
loan guarantee.64 
The Subcommittee also exercised prudence by limiting the scope of 
the investigation to decisions made at the agency level as opposed to 
immediately requesting information from the White House.  Judicial 
precedent suggests that the rationale for executive privilege is strongest 
when applied to the Office of the President, but this rationale is less 
applicable to communications at the agency level.65  Thus, the 
Subcommittee did not infringe on the President’s prerogative when it 
requested information from the agencies. 
The focus of the Solyndra investigation shifted from the agencies to 
the White House after the Subcommittee reviewed emails suggesting that 
the White House may have exerted political pressure on budget officials 
to approve the loan guarantee.66  The communications showed that White 
House officials repeatedly checked with OMB to see if the loan was 
approved, in anticipation of a groundbreaking event in September 2009, 
at which Vice President Biden intended to announce the loan approval.67  
In the emails, some OMB employees complained of pressure from the 
White House to review the loan.68  One budget official referred to “the 
time pressure we are under to sign-off on Solyndra.”69  Consequently, the 
Subcommittee sought communications between White House officials 
and the agencies to determine the extent of the White House’s 
 
63 United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see Orrin G. 
Hatch, Avoidance of Constitutional Conflicts, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 1025, 1027–28 (1987). 
64 Saqib Rahim, Republicans Say DOE Had Multiple Signs That Solyndra Was Failing, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2011/09/13/13climatewire-
republicans-say-doe-had-multiple-signs-that-63664.html. 
65 Judicial Watch Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 365 F.3d 1108, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
66 Joe Stephens & Carol D. Leonnig, Solyndra Loan: White House Pressed on Review 
of Solar Company Now Under Investigation, WASH. POST (Sept. 13, 2011), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/white-house-pushed-500-million-loan-to-solar-
company-now-under-investigation/2011/09/13/gIQAr3WbQK_story.html. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
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involvement as critical decisions were being made about the loan.70 
 
B. The White House Accommodates the Subcommittee’s Initial 
Request 
At this point in the investigation, the White House properly chose to 
accommodate the Subcommittee’s request for information.  Inter-branch 
conflicts are a natural part of our constitutional system, but these conflicts 
must be approached with a “spirit of dynamic compromise.”71  The White 
House chose the right course by fulfilling its constitutional mandate to 
work with the legislative branch. 
The White House could have argued that communications between 
the White House and the agencies were covered by executive privilege.  
To be sure, other presidents have argued that executive privilege applies 
broadly within the executive branch.72  The Clinton administration 
claimed that all communications between the White House and federal 
agencies were presumptively privileged.73  However, it would have been 
politically untenable for the White House to invoke executive privilege 
at this stage in the investigation, and it is doubtful that a court would have 
upheld the privilege. 
Not all types of executive branch communications are protected 
equally.  Courts have divided the broader category of executive privilege 
into sub-categories, such as the “deliberative process privilege” and the 
“presidential communications privilege.”74  The deliberative process 
privilege protects “predecisiononal” executive branch communications, 
while the presidential communications privilege protects 
communications by only the President and his top advisors.75  A top 
advisor is defined as someone who works in “operational proximity” to 
the President.76  The presidential communications privilege covers both 
 
70 Emails Show White House Pressure Ahead of Solar Company Loan Approval, FOX 
NEWS (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/09/13/gop-to-hold-hearing-
on-now-bankrupt-solar-company-that-obama-once-touted/. 
71 Ensuring Executive Branch Accountability: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 41 (2007) 
(statement of Beth Nolan, Former White House Counsel) (quoting United States v. Am. Tel. 
& Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). 
72 Carter, supra note 13. 
73 GARVEY & DOLAN, supra note 38, at 8. 
74 In re Sealed Case (Espy), 121 F.3d 729, 737–40 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
75 Id. at 743 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974)). 
76 Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 910 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
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pre-deliberative and post-decisional materials.77  The presidential 
communications privilege is grounded in the separation of powers and is 
more difficult to overcome.78  The deliberative process privilege is 
grounded in the common law and presents a lower bar for parties seeking 
information from the executive.79 
The White House could have attempted to withhold sensitive 
communications under the presidential communications privilege.  The 
Subcommittee requested communications between agency officials and 
White House staff prior to President Obama’s May 2010 visit to a 
Solyndra plant.80  The Subcommittee was especially interested in 
communications from top administration officials, such as White House 
Senior Advisor, Valerie Jarrett and Vice-President Biden’s Chief of Staff, 
Ron Klain.81  Under the precedent set by Espy, the White House could 
have argued that the presidential communications privilege applied 
because Jarrett and Klain “solicited and received” the email 
communications.82  Under Espy, these two officials had “broad and 
significant responsibility” for investigating and formulating the advice on 
Solyndra for the President.83 
Even though the presidential communications privilege might have 
applied, the White House made the right decision not to invoke it.  In 
order to invoke the presidential communications privilege, the White 
House would need to draw attention to the fact that two of President 
Obama’s top aides, Valerie Jarrett and Ron Klain, solicited the 
communications about Solyndra.  The fact that two top aides were so 
interested in Solyndra would suggest that the White House harbored 
concerns about Solyndra before the President’s trip.  Thus, invoking the 
presidential communications privilege was politically untenable at a time 
when the White House was attempting to distance itself from the 
 
77 Espy, 121 F.3d at 745. 
78 Id. 
79 Id.  
80 Committee Approves Subpoena After White House Fails to Turn Over Internal 
Solyndra Documents, HOUSE ENERGY & COMMERCE COMM. (Nov. 3, 2011), 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/press-release/committee-approves-subpoena-after-white-
house-fails-turn-over-internal-solyndra#sthash.KZ1AA6aV.dpuf. 
81 Committee Prepares to Seek Subpoena of White House Documents, HOUSE ENERGY & 
COMMERCE COMM. (Oct. 28, 2011), 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/News/PRArticle.aspx?NewsID=9055 [hereinafter 
Subpoena]. 
82 Espy, 121 F.3d at 752. 
83 Id. 
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decisions that were made about Solyndra. 
The White House also could have invoked the deliberative process 
privilege, but such an attempt would likely be unsuccessful.  As noted 
above, the deliberative process privilege is rooted in the common law, 
and it is easier to overcome.84  The Solyndra investigation was a legitimate 
area of congressional oversight.  If the battle over information ended up 
in court at this stage in the investigation, a judge would have to balance 
the interests of confidentiality against accountability and would likely 
determine that Congress’ right to information was enough to overcome 
executive privilege. 
 
C. Request for Internal White House Communications Escalates 
the Conflict 
Up until this point, the Subcommittee had respected the President’s 
prerogatives while fulfilling its own constitutional duty to conduct 
oversight.  This all changed, however, when the Subcommittee asked for 
all internal White House communications regarding Solyndra.85  The 
Subcommittee’s request presented a major logistical challenge because 
the Counsel’s Office would need to sort through every email that 
mentioned the word “Solyndra.”86  More importantly, the request impeded 
on the President’s prerogative to keep his advisors’ communications 
confidential.  The White House likely felt that the Subcommittee was on 
a fishing expedition.  Chairman Sterns acknowledged that the subpoena 
was broad and said in an interview that he thought the subpoena would 
even cover communications on President Obama’s BlackBerry.87  
Therefore, it was no surprise that White House Counsel, Kathryn 
Ruemmler told the Subcommittee that the White House could not comply 
with such an overly broad information request. 
Ruemmler did not invoke executive privilege, but she alluded to the 
 
84 Id. at 745. 
85 Joe Stephens & Carol D. Leonnig, Solyndra: House Panel Subpoenas Internal White 
House Documents, WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2011), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/solyndra-house-panel-subpoeas-white-house-for-
first-time/2011/11/03/gIQAtmjjiM_story.html. 
86 Andrew Restuccia, White House Delivers Solyndra Documents, Rebuffs Full GOP 
Subpoena, THE HILL (Nov. 11, 2011, 10:23 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-
environment/193169-white-house-provides-solyndra-documents-rebuffs-subpoena-request. 
87 Darren Samuelsohn, GOP Solyndra Probe Wants Obama’s Blackberry Messages, 
POLITICO (Oct. 6, 2011, 4:06 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1011/65361.html. 
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prerogative in her response.88  She wrote that the Subcommittee’s request 
“implicates longstanding and significant institutional Executive Branch 
confidentiality interests.”89  Ruemmler also drew upon the language of 
several District of Columbia Circuit cases when she wrote that the 
Subcommittee did not articulate how the requested materials were 
“demonstrably critical” to the Subcommittee’s investigation.90  Ruemmler 
gently reminded the Subcommittee that they would need to be far more 
specific in their request if they had any hope of overcoming the White 
House’s presumptive privilege to keep these communications 
confidential. 
Ruemmler was right to challenge the Subcommittee’s argument that 
internal White House communications were required to understand the 
White House’s influence on the agencies during the review of the 
Solyndra loan.  Communications between the White House and the 
agencies offered the best evidence as to whether the White House 
asserted political pressure on DOE, OMB, or the Treasury while the 
Solyndra loan was under review.  As Ruemmler noted, the agencies had 
“produced over 70,000 pages of documents, participated in nine briefings 
for Committee staff and provided testimony at several Committee 
hearings” related to Solyndra.91  Of course, it is not uncommon in 
congressional investigations for agencies to respond to requests for 
information by overwhelming investigators with documents of marginal 
utility.92  However, the Subcommittee did not argue that they were being 
flooded with useless documents. 
Congress should be circumspect when asking for the 
communications of presidential advisors and should only demand 
disclosure when it is in the national interest.  The Subcommittee had good 
reason to disclose communications between the White House and 
 
88 Letter from Kathryn H. Ruemmler, Counsel to the President, to Rep. Fred Upton, 
Chairman, Comm. on Energy & Commerce, & Rep. Cliff Stearns, Chairman, Subcomm. on 
Oversight & Investigations, Comm. on Energy & Commerce (Oct. 14, 2011), available at 
http://www.thepoliticalguide.com/Items/Solyndra/WHC%20Response.pdf [hereinafter 
Response]. 
89 Id. 
90 See Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 
731 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see also In re Sealed Case (Espy), 121 F.3d 729, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
91 Response, supra note 88. 
92 See, e.g., Transcript: Sen. Dianne Feinstein Says CIA Searched Intelligence Committee 
Computers, WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/transcript-sen-dianne-feinstein-says-cia-searched-intelligence-committee-
computers/2014/03/11/200dc9ac-a928-11e3-8599-ce7295b6851c_story.html. 
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agencies, but they had not articulated a strong argument as to why 
disclosure of internal White House communications was needed. 
 
D. The Subcommittee Issues White House Subpoenas 
The two political branches must make compromises when 
negotiating with each other because “accommodation between the two 
branches” is contemplated by the Constitution.93  Ruemmler ended her 
response to the Subcommittee with a promise that the White House would 
continue to cooperate with “legitimate Congressional requests” for 
information.94  Despite the White House’s offer to negotiate, Upton and 
Stearns announced that they were considering a vote to subpoena the 
White House.95  In a joint statement, Upton and Stearns claimed that the 
Subcommittee would only authorize subpoenas as a last resort, but said 
that the Subcommittee was prepared to take this “serious step” because 
of the White House’s “stonewall on Solyndra.”96  Their claim that the 
administration was “slow-walking” the investigation seems far-fetched 
considering the Subcommittee and the administration reached an 
agreement the previous day that DOE Secretary, Steven Chu, would 
testify about Solyndra before the Subcommittee.97 
Despite the White House efforts regarding accommodation, the 
Subcommittee voted to serve subpoenas on White House Chief of Staff, 
Bill Daley, and Vice President Joe Biden’s Chief of Staff, Bruce Reed, 
for all documents “referring or relating” in any way to Solyndra.98  Issuing 
such a broad subpoena may have been a negotiating tactic on the part of 
Upton and Stearns, but it was certainly not the type of dynamic 
compromise the Framers encouraged.  Furthermore, the decision to issue 
subpoenas was premature considering that the Subcommittee was still in 
the process of negotiating with the White House.  Just the previous day, 
Ruemmler offered to provide documents if the Subcommittee narrowed 
the scope of their request.99 
 
93 United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121, 131 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
94 Response, supra note 88. 
95 Subpoena, supra note 81. 
96 Subpoena, supra note 81. 
97 Darren Samuelsohn, Steven Chu’s Solyndra Testimony Set for Nov. 17, POLITICO (Oct. 
27, 2011, 6:22 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1011/67036.html. 
98 Andrew Stiles, WH Rejects House Subpoena for Solyndra Docs, NAT’L. REV. ONLINE 
(Nov. 4, 2011, 5:17 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/282343/wh-rejects-house-
subpoena-solyndra-docs-andrew-stiles#. 
99 Darren Samuelsohn, W.H. To House: Solyndra Subpoenas Seek Too Much, POLITICO 
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Upton and Stearns should have accepted the White House’s offer to 
work with the Subcommittee to respond to a more focused request that 
would balance the interests of Congress and the President.  The 
Constitution requires that the parties work together to resolve their 
differences.100  As one court put it, “[c]ompromise and cooperation, rather 
than confrontation, should be the aim” of the two political branches.101  In 
this instance, the decision to issue subpoenas was aimed at confrontation 
rather than cooperation. 
Previously, the White House aptly accommodated congressional 
requests, but this time, the White House properly pushed back against the 
subpoenas.  The subpoenas were overly broad and focused on a “general 
curiosity” about White House communications.102  The Counsel’s Office 
has a responsibility to protect the prerogatives of the Office of the 
President.103  As such, Ruemmler appropriately argued that the 
Subcommittee’s general curiosity did not justify “encroaching on 
longstanding and important Executive Branch confidentiality 
interests.”104  To be sure, the White House stood on firm legal ground to 
push back against the Subcommittee’s subpoenas, but political reality, 
along with the historical and legal precedent, suggested that the White 
House had to turn over some documents to show that the White House 
was negotiating in good faith. 
 
E. Pressure on the White House to Respond to Subpoenas 
The Counsel’s Office wanted to protect the President’s prerogatives, 
but Ruemmler likely knew that invoking executive privilege would have 
political ramifications.  Ever since the Nixon administration, presidents 
have been reluctant to invoke executive privilege because of its negative 
association with the Watergate scandal.105  Presidents do not want to give 
the public the impression that they are invoking executive privilege to 
cover up a politically embarrassing controversy. 
It is possible that the Subcommittee subpoenaed the White House in 
 
(Nov. 4, 2011, 4:49 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1111/67654.html. 
100 United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel Co., 567 F.2d 121, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
101 United States v. House of Representatives of United States, 556 F. Supp. 150, 153 
(D.D.C. 1983). 
102 Samuelsohn, W.H. To House: Solyndra Subpoenas Seek Too Much, supra note 99. 
103 Maryanne Borrelli, Karen Hult & Nancy Kassop, The White House Counsel’s Office, 
31 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q., 561, 563 (Apr. 21, 2004). 
104 Samuelsohn, W.H. To House: Solyndra Subpoenas Seek Too Much, supra note 99. 
105 ROZELL, supra note 7, at 121. 
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order to force the White House to officially invoke the privilege.  A press 
release issued by the Subcommittee reads “[w]hile we of course respect 
Executive Privilege, the White House Counsel—in two separate letters to 
the Subcommittee—has not asserted it.”106  Republicans might have been 
pressuring President Obama to assert the privilege to see how he would 
respond, since his administration had claimed to run the “most 
transparent administration in the history of our country” and invoking the 
privilege would make it look like the administration had something to 
hide.107 
The fact that the Subcommittee lacked bipartisan legitimacy 
mitigated the political pressure to disclose internal White House 
communications.  When Upton and Stearns made the decision to issue 
subpoenas, they lost the backing of the Democratic minority, and the vote 
to issue subpoenas split along party lines.108  The Committee’s Ranking 
Member, Henry Waxman (D-CA), and the Subcommittee’s Ranking 
Member, Diana DeGette (D-CO), argued that issuing subpoenas was 
unnecessary, and Waxman went so far as to say that the committee’s 
leadership was more interested in “confrontation with the president” than 
“information for the investigation.”109  This was not simply a situation 
where Waxman and DeGette were holding the party line and supporting 
the White House.  On the contrary, the two Democrats had written to 
Stearns after Solyndra declared bankruptcy and asked him to invite 
former Solyndra Chief Executive Officer, Brian Harrison, to testify 
before the Subcommittee.110  Waxman and DeGette were particularly 
troubled by the fact that Harrison had met with the Committee less than 
two months earlier and assured them that Solyndra was in a strong 
 
106 Subpoena, supra note 81. 
107 Josh Gerstein and Patrick Gavin, Why Reporters are Down on Obama, POLITICO (Apr. 
28, 2010, 4:38 AM), http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=42A9C609-18FE-70B2-
A84A2D8F74C77116. 
108 White House Counsel Slams House Panel's Solyndra Subpoena, CNN (Nov. 4, 2011, 
8:47 PM), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-11-04/politics/politics_solyndra-
subpoena_1_solyndra-loan-guarantee-subpoena-white-house?_s=PM:POLITICS. 
109 Andrew Restuccia, House Republicans Vote to Subpoena White House for Solyndra 
Documents, THE HILL (Nov. 3, 2011, 2:50 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-
wire/191563-house-gop-votes-to-subpoena-white-house-for-solyndra-documents; White 
House Counsel Slams House Panel's Solyndra Subpoena, supra note 108. 
110 Letter from Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Member, Energy & Commerce Comm., & 
Diana DeGette, Ranking Member, Oversight & Investigations Subcomm. to Cliff Stearns, 
Chairman, Submcomm. on Oversight & Investigations (Sept. 7, 2011), available at 
http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?q=news/ranking-members-
waxman-and-degette-request-solyndra-ceo-testimony. 
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financial position.111  However, when Stearns and Upton held a vote to 
subpoena the White House, they lost the Democrats and the credibility 
that comes with a bipartisan investigation. 
The White House may have harbored doubts about the strength of 
its legal position if the Subcommittee challenged its claim of executive 
privilege in court.  The President’s right to confidential advice is strongest 
when the communications relate to the President’s Article II powers, such 
as the Commander-in-Chief power.112  The loan guarantee program was 
created as part of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, so an executive privilege 
claim might not be as convincing in the context of an energy program 
created by statute.113 
Historical precedent suggests that the White House had to make 
concessions to the Subcommittee.  The Counsel’s Office generally 
attempts to compromise with Congress during inter-branch conflicts 
about access to information as part of the natural give-and-take that 
occurs in the political process.114  During the Clinton administration, the 
Counsel’s Office had a policy of complying with congressional requests 
for information “to the fullest extent consistent with the constitutional 
and statutory obligations of the Executive Branch.”115  Similarly, the 
George H.W. Bush administration said that it would only invoke 
executive privilege after the executive had done “the utmost to reach an 
accommodation” with Congress.116  Given this precedent, the Counsel’s 
Office was under pressure to make some accommodations to the 
Subcommittee.  As such, the White House turned over 135 pages of 
documents that the White House said met the “legitimate oversight 
interests” of the Subcommittee.117  Ruemmler informed the Subcommittee 
that the White House was withholding about a dozen documents related 
to the restructuring of the loan guarantee because of the “deliberative 
nature” of the communications.118  However, Ruemmler offered to make 
 
111 Id. 
112 See, e.g., GARVEY & DOLAN, supra note 38; ROZELL, supra note 7, at 199. 
113 Restuccia, All About Solyndra, supra note 40. 
114 GARVEY & DOLAN, supra note 38, at 8. 
115 Id. at 12. 
116 Id. at 12–13. 
117 Restuccia, White House Delivers Solyndra Documents, Rebuffs Full GOP Subpoena, 
supra note 86. 
118 Restuccia, White House Delivers Solyndra Documents, Rebuffs Full GOP Subpoena, 
supra note 86. 
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the documents available to committee staff for review.119  On its face, this 
appeared to be a fair concession on the part of the executive without 
turning over every document that mentioned Solyndra. 
 
F. The Subcommittee Overreaches and Threatens Contempt Vote 
Under the paradigm prescribed by the Constitution, the White House 
had met its side of the bargain.  The Subcommittee had several options at 
this point in the investigation.  They could (1) drop the investigation; (2) 
file suit in federal district court to seek civil enforcement of the 
subpoenas; (3) hold a contempt vote and send the contempt report to the 
United States Attorney for the District of Columbia and ask him to press 
charges under federal contempt statutes; or (4) continue to negotiate with 
the White House and use political pressure to get more information.  The 
fourth option was likely the best option for the Subcommittee if they 
wanted to continue the investigation.  The negotiation between the 
branches is meant to be a process with a lot of give-and-take, but this 
process only works if each side makes accommodations.  It does not 
appear that the Subcommittee was interested in negotiating in good faith.  
Instead, the Subcommittee claimed that the White House had “cherry 
picked” certain documents to avoid complying fully with the subpoena, 
and the Subcommittee threatened to hold a contempt vote.120 
The threat to hold the White House in contempt generated 
newspaper headlines, and the press reported on the investigation as an 
inter-branch conflict.121  Nevertheless, the threat to hold the White House 
in contempt was just as much about intra-branch and intra-party conflicts.  
Personality and the personal agenda of members often drive 
congressional investigations, and such factors were at play in the 
Solyndra investigation.  Subcommittee Chairman Stearns made the push 
for a contempt vote while Committee Chairman Upton wanted to take a 
more cautious approach.122  Upton likely recognized that a contempt vote 
could lead to a constitutional showdown with the White House, which he 
preferred to avoid.123  As Chairman of the Committee, Upton had the final 
say on all matters, but he may have felt that Stearns was positioning 
 
119 Restuccia, White House Delivers Solyndra Documents, Rebuffs Full GOP Subpoena, 
supra note 86. 
120 Darren Samuelsohn, Cliff Stearns: Contempt of Congress Vote under Consideration, 
POLITICO (Jan. 31, 2012, 9:42 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0112/72203.html. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Samuelsohn, Right Nips Fred Upton on Solyndra Handling, supra note 52. 
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himself to challenge Upton for the Committee Chairman position after 
the 2012 elections.  As such, Upton possibly felt pressure from his right 
flank to take a hard stance against the administration. 
Upton may have also felt pressure to be aggressive with the 
investigation because of a disagreement over congressional jurisdiction.  
Soon after Solyndra declared bankruptcy, House Oversight and 
Government Reform Chairman, Darrell Issa sent a letter to the White 
House requesting information regarding the handling of the Solyndra 
loan.124  Upton and Issa praised each other publicly for looking into 
Solyndra, but this struggle over jurisdiction created friction between the 
two chairmen.125  It is possible that Upton felt political pressure from both 
Issa and Stearns to threaten a contempt vote, against his better judgment.  
Finally, Upton may have taken a hard line because he recognized that he 
was vulnerable to criticism since he once pushed for the DOE to fund a 
solar power company in his home state.126 
 
IV. HOW THE CONFLICT WOULD BE VIEWED BY THE COURTS 
The Subcommittee’s threat to hold the White House in contempt was 
the high point of the inter-branch conflict.  Soon after, the White House 
turned over 313 pages of internal communications, and the contempt vote 
never occurred.127  In June 2012, Chairman Sterns said that the Committee 
was “getting closer to getting closure” on the Solyndra investigation, and 
the investigation was officially closed in August 2012 when the 
Committee released a report in which it referred to Solyndra as a 
“cautionary tale.”128  The White House’s decision to turn over 313 pages 
of internal communications prevented further escalation, and it is 
unknown how the conflict would have been perceived if it had found its 
 
124 Jonathan Strong, A Crowded Line For Solyndra, ROLL CALL (Oct. 18, 2011, 12:00 
AM), http://www.rollcall.com/issues/57_44/Crowded-Line-for-Solyndra-209594-
1.html?zkMobileView=true. 
125 Id. 
126 Steven Mufson & Jia Lynn Yang, Fred Upton, GOP Critic of Solyndra Loan, Sought 
Funds for Mich. Solar Firm, WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2011), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/fred-upton-gop-critic-of-solyndra-loan-
sought-funds-for-mich-solar-firm/2011/11/16/gIQAJKGhSN_story.html. 
127 Restuccia & Geman, White House Gives Up More Solyndra Docs, supra note 53. 
128 Ben Geman, GOP Probe: Solyndra a “Cautionary Tale,” THE HILL (Aug. 2, 2012, 
4:23 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/241869-gop-report-solyndra-collapse-a-
cautionary-tale-of-political-pressures; Andrew Restuccia, Cliff Stearns: ‘Closure’ Near in 
Solyndra Investigation, POLITICO (June 27, 2012, 10:42 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0612/77898.html. 
CRAWFORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2015  2:11 PM 
2015] SOLAR POWER STRUGGLE 21 
way into federal court.  The following section puts forward a legal 
standard that a federal court could have followed if the Subcommittee had 
sought civil enforcement of the subpoenas. 
 
A. Courts are Reluctant to Intervene in Inter-Branch Disputes 
It is rare for inter-branch disputes to end up in the courts because 
most controversies regarding the access to information are resolved 
through compromises between the executive and legislature.129  Courts 
have made clear that the political branches should settle their 
disagreements outside of the judicial system.130  In United States v. House 
of Representatives, the district court dismissed the case and encouraged 
the two branches to “settle their differences without further judicial 
involvement.”131  Both the legislative and executive branches typically 
prefer to reach an agreement outside of court, presumably in order to 
avoid setting judicial precedent. 
Even when the executive and legislative branches are prepared to 
litigate, they are often kept out of the courts because of restrictions on 
standing.  In Walker v. Cheney,132 the Government Accountability Office 
(“GAO”) sought information from the White House on the National 
Energy Policy Development Group (“NEPDG”).133  When the GAO was 
unable to gain access to the records, the Comptroller General filed suit 
against Vice President Cheney in the District Court for the District of 
Columbia.134  The court dismissed the case when it found that the GAO 
lacked standing.135  Several years later in Committee on House Judiciary 
v. Miers,136 the same district court found that the House Judiciary 
Committee had standing to bring a civil lawsuit to enforce subpoenas 
against White House officials, Harriet Miers and Josh Bolton.137  Thus, 
the Miers decision opens the door for future litigation between the 
legislative and executive branches. 
All three branches may prefer to negotiate inter-branch conflicts 
outside of courts, but the judiciary has an important role to play if the 
 
129 ROZELL, supra note 7, at 205. 
130 United States v House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150, 153 (D.D.C. 1983). 
131 Id. at 153. 
132 230 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2002). 
133 Id. at 52. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 75. 
136 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008). 
137 Id. at 68. 
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executive and the legislative branches are unable to reach a resolution.  
Some scholars argue that rather than litigating disputes, Congress should 
use its own “enforcement mechanisms” when trying to get information 
from the executive.138  The legislature could, for example, use its power 
of the purse to reduce the budget of a particular department or the Senate 
could refrain from confirming nominations.139 
History, however, suggests that the courts have an important role to 
play in settling disputes between the branches.140  Marbury v. Madison 
laid forth the principal that the judiciary has the final authority to 
determine whether the President and the legislature are acting within the 
powers granted to them by the Constitution.141  Constitutional scholar, 
Raoul Berger has criticized the concept of executive privilege, yet even 
he argues that Congress cannot “unilaterally decide a boundary dispute 
with the Executive, for neither branch, in Madison’s words, has an 
exclusive or ‘superior right of settling the boundaries between their 
respective powers.’”142  This power of settling boundary disputes is 
reserved for the judiciary.143 
Finally, the judiciary has itself recognized that it may be required to 
mediate these inter-branch disputes.144  As noted above, the district court 
in United States v. House of Representatives encouraged the two sides to 
negotiate an agreement; however, the court also recognized that it would 
be “required to resolve the dispute by determining the validity of the 
Administrator’s claim of executive privilege” if the two branches did not 
reach a settlement.145 
 
B. What Standard Should a Court Apply? 
Currently, it is not clear what legal standard a court would apply 
when weighing the President’s claim of executive privilege against 
Congress’s request for information.  The Supreme Court has not 
addressed how this balancing should be done in the congressional-
 
138 See Josh Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt of Congress, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1083, 
1153 (2009). 
139 Id. at 1152. 
140 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176–78 (1803). 
141 Id. 
142 RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 304 (1974). 
143 Id. 
144 United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150, 152 (D.D.C. 1983). 
145 Id. 
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executive context, so courts have applied different standards.146  For 
example, in Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign 
Activities v. Nixon (“Senate Committee”), the District of Columbia 
Circuit evaluated whether the requested materials were “demonstrably 
critical to the responsible fulfillment of the Committee’s functions.”147 
This article suggests that a court should apply the legal standard 
from the Espy decision.  In Espy, the District of Columbia Circuit applied 
a “specific need” standard when President Clinton asserted executive 
privilege against a subpoena issued by a grand jury.148  Building upon the 
Nixon Court’s desire to balance the competing interest of confidentiality 
and accountability, the District of Columbia Circuit held that a party 
would need to meet the two parts of the specific need standard to 
overcome executive privilege.149  Under this standard, the party had to (1) 
demonstrate that each discrete group of the subpoenaed materials was 
likely to contain important evidence and (2) show that the evidence was 
not available with due diligence elsewhere.150 
Espy explored what is necessary to overcome a claim of executive 
privilege in the context of a criminal proceeding, but the specific need 
standard should be transported from the grand jury situation and applied 
to the congressional-executive context.  The same tension between 
confidentiality and accountability are at stake in both criminal and 
congressional investigations.  Indeed, these are the competing values that 
the Framers recognized were inherent in a system of checks and balances. 
 In Espy, the Court of Appeals explicitly said, “we underscore that 
our opinion should not be read as in any way affecting the scope of the 
privilege in the congressional-executive context.”151  While the Espy court 
was clear that it did not wish to opine on the congressional-executive 
context, it makes good sense to look to the Espy decision for guidance for 
two reasons.  First, the majority of executive privilege claims arise in the 
grand jury-executive context so the case law is more developed in this 
area.  Second, the two contexts are analogous in that the court must 
mediate the conflicting interests of two political branches in both 
circumstances. 
 
146 See, e.g., In re Sealed Case (Espy), 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Senate Select 
Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
147 Nixon, 498 F.2d at 731. 
148 Espy, 121 F.3d at 754. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 753. 
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The Espy court was not overly prescriptive in describing how much 
“need” a grand jury must show to get access to presumptively privileged 
material.  Certainly, such a test is highly dependent on the facts at hand, 
but the court was guided by a desire to balance the constitutionally-based 
interests of two branches.152  The court concluded its opinion by writing, 
“[w]e believe that the principles we have outlined in this opinion achieve 
a delicate and appropriate balance between openness and informed 
presidential deliberation.”153  A similar balancing test is needed when the 
competing interests of the congressional power of inquiry and executive 
branch confidentiality are at odds.  A balancing test helps ensure that the 
court is protecting the constitutional interests of both the legislature and 
the executive. 
The specific need standard from Espy does not explicitly tell future 
courts how to balance a President’s need for confidentiality against the 
public’s interest in transparency.  However, an overly prescriptive test is 
not desirable.  The flexibility of the specific need standard allows courts 
to mediate congressional-executive disputes while respecting the 
separation of powers doctrine.  Indeed, the balancing test gives courts the 
ability to apply the standard to different contexts to ensure that the 
“constitutionally assigned functions” of the respective branches are 
protected.154  For example, Congress would have a higher standard of need 
if subpoenaing information pertaining to one of the Article II powers, 
such as national security.155  However, a President should not be able to 
guard any or all information by claiming that it pertains to national 
security.  The Espy balancing test provides a route for the courts to 
review, in camera, requests for information that the executive has said 
pertain to national security. 
 
C. How Would a Court Resolve the Solyndra Conflict? 
If the Subcommittee had sought the civil enforcement of the 
subpoenas, and a court had applied the Espy standard, the standard would 
likely favor the protection of the presidential communications.  The 
Subcommittee subpoenaed information from the White House Chief of 
 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 762. 
154 Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs. (Nixon II), 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977). 
155 Espy, 121 F.3d at 748 (identifying the President’s Article II powers and 
responsibilities as the constitutional basis of the presidential communications privilege). 
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Staff and the Vice President’s Chief of Staff.156  Under the standard set 
forth in Espy, these officials would qualify as close White House advisors 
in “operational proximity” to the President, and so the White House 
would stand on solid ground to argue that the presidential communication 
privilege should apply.157 
Moreover, the Subcommittee would have a difficult task showing 
that the privilege should be overcome.  Under the Espy standard, the 
Subcommittee would need to demonstrate that: (1) each discrete group of 
the subpoenaed materials was likely to contain important evidence, and 
(2) the evidence was not available with due diligence elsewhere.158  The 
Subcommittee was investigating whether the White House exerted 
political pressure on budget officials to approve the loan guarantee to 
Solyndra.  The best evidence of political interference would be 
communications between the White House and the agencies, not 
communication within the White House.  The White House had already 
supplied the communications between the White House and the agencies, 
so the Subcommittee would have a difficult time meeting the second 
prong of the Espy standard, that is, important evidence was not available 
with due diligence elsewhere.  Since the White House had already turned 
over the best evidence, the Subcommittee would be requesting materials 
that were merely cumulative.  Therefore, the Subcommittee would not 
meet the specific need standard and would not overcome the President’s 
presumptive privilege. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
When Justice Antonin Scalia was head of the Office of Legal 
Counsel in the mid-1970s, he testified before Congress on the subject of 
executive privilege.  Scalia explained that in inter-branch conflicts, the 
resolution is likely to lie in “the hurly-burly, the give-and-take of the 
political process between the legislative and executive.”159  In the 
Solyndra investigation, the two branches reached a resolution after the 
Subcommittee threatened to hold the White House in contempt.160  
 
156 Stiles, WH Rejects House Subpoena for Solyndra Docs, supra note 98. 
157 Espy, 121 F.3d at 752. 
158 Id. at 754. 
159 Executive Privilege-Secrecy in Government: Hearing on S. 2170, S. 2378, and S. 2420 
Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the S. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 
94th Cong. 87 (1975) (statement of Antonin Scalia, Assistant Att’y Gen. Office of Legal 
Counsel). 
160 Restuccia & Geman, White House Gives Up More Solyndra Docs, supra note 53. 
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Subsequent disagreements were resolved in a manner consistent with the 
separation of powers principle.  For example, in mid-February 2012, the 
Subcommittee threatened to subpoena five administration officials.161  
The White House responded by arranging for the officials to meet with 
congressional staff, and the Subcommittee canceled the scheduled 
subpoena vote.162  This is exactly the sort of inter-branch negotiation that 
should have been occurring throughout the Solyndra investigation. 
The resolution to the Solyndra controversy was eventually found in 
the “hurly-burly” of the investigation, but if the controversy had found its 
way into court, application of the Espy specific need standard would have 
allowed the court to balance Congress’ interest in ensuring transparency 
against the executive’s interest in secrecy. 
 
161 Darren Samuelsohn, White House Agrees to Let Officials Talk on Solyndra, 
POLITICO (Feb. 16, 2012, 5:45 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0212/72999.html#ixzz1oMvmtFMf. 
162 Id. 
